Cache attacks exploit memory access patterns of cryptographic implementations. Constant-time implementation techniques have become an indispensable tool in fighting cache timing attacks. These techniques engineer the memory accesses of cryptographic operations to follow a uniform key independent pattern. However, the constant-time behavior is dependent on the underlying architecture, which can be highly complex and often incorporates unpublished features. The CacheBleed attack targets cache bank conflicts and thereby invalidates the assumption that microarchitectural side-channel adversaries can only observe memory with cache line granularity. In this work, we propose MemJam, which utilizes 4K Aliasing to establish a sidechannel attack that exploits false dependency of memory read-after-write events and provides a high quality intra cache line timing channel. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate the first key recovery attacks on constant-time implementations of all symmetric block ciphers supported in the current intel integrated performance primitives (Intel IPP) cryptographic library: triple DES, AES and SM4. Further, we demonstrate the first intra cache level timing attack on SGX by reproducing the AES key recovery results on an enclave that performs encryption using the aforementioned constant-time implementation of AES. Our results show that we can not only use this side channel to efficiently attack memory dependent cryptographic operations but also to bypass proposed protections. Compared to CacheBleed, which is limited to older processor generations, MemJam is the first intra cache level attack applicable to all major Intel processors including the latest generations and also applies to the SGX extension.
Introduction
In cryptographic implementations, timing channels can be introduced by key dependent operations, which can be exploited by local or remote adversaries [18, 58] . Modern microarchitectures are complex and support various shared resources, and the operating system (OS) maximizes the resource sharing among concurrent tasks [52, 63] . From a security standpoint, concurrent tasks with different permissions share the same hardware resources, and these resources can expose exploitable timing channels. A typical model for exploiting microarchitectural timing channels is for a spy process to cause resource contention with a victim process and to measure the timing of its own or of the victim operations [2, 45, 62, 67] . The observed timing behavior give adversaries strong evidence on the victim's resource usage pattern, thus they leak critical runtime data. Among the shared resources, attacks on cache have received significant attention, and their practicality has been demonstrated in scenarios such as cloud computing [31, 36, 45, 62, 76, 79] . A distinguishable feature of cache attacks is the ability to track memory accesses with high temporal and spatial resolution. Thus, they excel at exploiting cryptographic implementations with secret dependent memory accesses [11, 35, 58, 68] . Examples of such vulnerable implementations include using S-Box tables [71] , and efficient implementations of modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication [34, 48] .
The weakness of key dependent cache activities has motivated researchers and practitioners to protect cryptographic implementations against cache attacks [15, 67] . The simplest approach is to minimize the memory footprint of lookup tables. Using a single 8-Bit S-Box in the advanced encryption standard (AES) rather than T-Tables makes cache attacks on AES inefficient in a noisy environment, since the adversary can only distinguish accesses between 4 different cache lines. Combining small tables with cache state normalization, i.e., loading all table entries into cache before each operation, defeats cache attacks in asynchronous mode, where the adversary is only able to perform one observation per operation [59] . More advanced side channels such as exploitation of the thread scheduler [33] , cache attack on interrupted execution of Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX) [54] , performance degradation [6] and leakage of other microarchitectural resources [1, 3] remind us of the importance of constanttime software implementations. One way to achieve constant-time memory behavior is the adoption of small tables in combination with accessing all cache lines on each lookup [67] . The overhead would be limited and is minimized by the parallelism we can achieve in modern processors. Another constant-time approach adopted by some public cryptographic schemes is interleaving the multipliers in memory known as scatter-gather technique [16] .
Constant-time implementations have effectively eliminated the first generation of timing attacks that exploit obvious key dependent leakages. The common view is that performance penalty is the only downside which, once paid, there is no need to be further worried. However, this is far from the reality and constant-time implementations may actually give a false sense of security. A commonly overlooked fact is that constant-time implementations and related protections are relative to the underlying hardware [29] . In fact, there are major obstacles preventing us from obtaining true constant-time behavior. Processors constantly evolve with new microarchitectural fea-tures rolled quietly with each new release and the variety of such subtle features makes comprehensive evaluation impossible. A great example is the cache bank conflicts attack on OpenSSL RSA scatter-gather implementation: it shows that adversaries with intra cache level resolution can successfully bypass constant-time techniques relied on cache-line granularity [77] . As a consequence, what might appear as a perfect constanttime implementation becomes insecure in the next processor release-or worse-an unrecognized behavior might be discovered, invalidating the earlier assumption.
Our Contribution
We propose an attack named MemJam by exploiting false dependency of memory read-after-write, and demonstrate key recovery against three different cryptographic implementations which are secure against cache attacks with experimental results on both regular and SGX environments. In summary:
-False dependency attack A side-channel attack on the false dependency of memory read-after-write. We show how to dramatically slow down the victim's accesses to specific memory blocks, and how this read latency can be exploited to recover low address bits of the victim's memory accesses. [16, 67] , static and runtime analysis [46, 78] and new cache architecture [21, 47, 51, 73 ].
Experimental Setup and Generic Assumptions
Our experimental setup is a Dell XPS 8920 desktop machine with an Intel(R) Core i7-7700 processor running Ubuntu 16.04. The Core i7-7700 has 4 hyper-threaded physical cores. Our only assumptions are that the attacker is able to co-locate on one of the logical processor pairs within the same physical core as the victim. In the cryptographic attacks, the attacker can measure the time of victim encryption. The attacker further knows which cryptographic implementation is used by the victim, but she does not need to have any knowledge of the victim's binary or the offset of the S-Box tables. We will discuss assumptions that are specific to the attack on SGX at Sect. 6.
Background

Multitasking
The memory management subsystem shares the dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) among all concurrent tasks, in which a virtual memory region is allocated for each task transparent to the physical memory. Each task is able to use its entire virtual address space without meddling of memory accesses from others. Memory allocations are performed in pages, where each virtual memory page can be stored in a DRAM page with a virtual-to-physical page mapping. The logical processors are also shared among these tasks and each logical processor executes instructions from one task at a time, and switches to another task. Memory write and read instructions work with virtual addresses, and the virtual address is translated to the corresponding physical address to perform the memory operation. The OS is responsible for page directory management and virtual page allocation. The OS assists the processor to perform virtual-to-physical address translation by performing an expensive page walk. The processor saves the address translation results in a memory known as Translation Look-aside Buffer (TLB) to avoid the software overhead introduced by the OS. Intel microarchitecture follows a multi-stage pipeline and adopts different optimization techniques to maximize the parallelism and multitasking during the pipeline stages [39]. Among these techniques, hyper-threading allows each core to run multiple concurrent threads, and each thread shares all the core-private resources. As a result, if one resource is busy by a thread, other threads can consume the remaining available resources. Hyper-threading is abstracted to the software stack: OS and applications interact with the logical processors.
Cache Memory
DRAM memory is slow compared to the internal CPU components. Modern microarchitectures take advantage of a hierarchy of cache memories to fill the speed gap. Intel processors have two levels of core-private cache (L1, L2), and a Last Level Cache (LLC) shared among all cores. The closer the cache memory is to the processor, the faster, but also smaller it is compared to the next level cache. Cache memory is organized into different sets, and each set can store some number of cache lines. The cache line size, which is 64 byte, is the block size for all memory operations outside of the CPU. The higher bits of the physical address of each cache line is used to determine which set to store/load the cache line. When the processor tries to access a cache line, a cache hit or miss occurs respective of its existence in the relevant cache set. If a cache miss occurs, the memory line will be stored to all 3 levels of cache and to the determined sets. Reloads from the same address would be much faster when the memory line exists in cache. In a multicore system, the processor has to keep cache consistent among all levels. In Intel architecture, cache lines follow a write-back policy, i.e., if the data in L1 cache is overwritten, all other levels will be updated. The LLC is inclusive of L2 and L1 caches, which means that if a cache line in LLC is evicted, the corresponding L1 and L2 cache lines will also be evicted [39] . These policies help Cache hierarchy of an Intel processor: the L3 cache is shared among available cores. Core-private caches such as L1 and L2 are shared between logical hyper-threading CPUs. Memory access dependencies are determined within the memory order buffer (MOB). An adversary who is co-located on the same core exploiting hyper-threading, can mount attacks on victims sharing the same resources to avoid stale cached data where one processor reads invalid data mutated by another processor.
L1 Cache Bottlenecks
The L1 cache port has a limited bandwidth and simultaneous accesses will block each other. This bottleneck is critical in super-scalar multiprocessor systems. Older processor generations adopted multiple banks as a workaround to this problem [5] , in which each bank can operate independently and serve one request at a time. While this partially solved the bandwidth limit, it creates the cache bank conflict phenomena where simultaneous accesses to the same bank will be blocked. Intel resolved the cache bank conflict issue with the Haswell generation [39] . Another bottleneck mentioned in various resources is due to the false dependency of memory addresses with the same cache set and offset [5, 39] . Simultaneous read and write with addresses that are multiples of 4 kB is not possible, and they halt each other. The processor cannot determine the dependency from the virtual address, and addresses with the same last 12 bits have the chance to map to the same physical address. Such simultaneous access can happen between two logical processors and/or during the out-of-order execution, where there is a chance that a memory write/read might be dependent on a memory read/write with the same last 12 bits of address. Such dependencies cannot be determined on the fly, thus they cause latency ( Fig. 1 ).
Cache Attacks
Cache attacks can be exploited by adversaries where they share system cache memory with benign users. In scenarios where the adversary can colocate with a victim on the same core, she can attack core-private resources such as L1 cache, e.g., OS adversaries [50, 54] . In cloud environment, virtualization platforms allow sharing of logical processors to different VMs; however, attacks on the shared LLC have a higher impact, since LLC is shared across the cores. In cache timing attacks, the attacker either measure the timing of the victim operations, e.g., Evict+Time [58] or the timing of his own memory accesses, e.g., Prime+Probe [45] . The attacker needs to have access to an accurate time resource such as the RDTSC instruction.
In the basic form, attacks are performed by one observation per entire operation. In certain scenarios, these attacks can be improved by interrupting the victim and collecting information about the intermediate memory states. Side-channel attacks exploiting cache bank conflicts rely on synchronous resource contention. CacheBleed methodology is somewhat similar to Prime+Probe, where the attacker performs repeated operations, and measures it's own access time [77] . In a cache bank conflict attack, the adversary repeatedly performs simultaneous reads to the same cache bank and measures their completion time. A victim on a colocated logical processor who access the same cache bank would cause latency to the attacker's memory reads.
MemJam: Read-After-Write Attack
MemJam utilizes false dependencies. Data dependency occurs when an instruction refers to the data of a preceding instruction. In pipelined designs, hazards and pipeline stalls can occur from dependencies if the previous instruction has not finished. There are cases where false dependencies occur, i.e. the pipeline stalls even though there is no true dependency. Reasons for false dependencies are register reuse and limited address space for the Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU). False dependencies degrade instruction level parallelism and cause overhead. The processor eliminates false dependencies arising from register reuse by a register renaming approach. However, there exist other false dependencies that need to be addressed during the software optimization, e.g. Partial Register Stalls [39, 40] .
In this work, we focus on a critical false dependency mentioned as 4K Aliasing where data that is multiples of 4K apart in the address space is seen as dependent. 4K Aliasing happens due to virtual addressing of L1 cache, where data is accessed using virtual addresses, but tagged and stored using physical addresses. Multiple virtual addresses can refer to the same data with the same physical address and the determination of dependency for concurrent memory accesses, requires virtual address translation. Physical and virtual address share the last 12 bits, and any data accesses whose addresses differ in the last 12 bits (i.e. the distance is not 4k) cannot have a dependency. For the fairly rare remaining cases, address translation needs to be done before resolving the dependency, which causes latency. Note that the granularity of the potential dependency, i.e. whether two addresses are considered "same", depends also on the microarchitecture, as dependencies can occur at the word or cache line granularity (i.e. ignoring the last 2 or last 6 bits of the address, respectively). These rare false dependencies due to 4K Aliasing can be exploited to attack memory, since the attacker can deliberately process falsely dependent data by matching the last 12 bits of his own address with a security critical data inside a victim process.
4K Aliasing has been mentioned in various places as an optimization problem existing on all major Intel processors [5, 39] . We verify the results of Yarom et al. [77] , the only security related work regarding false dependencies, which exploited write-after-read dependencies. The resulting timing leakage by write stall after read is not sufficient to be used in any cryptographic attack. MemJam exploits a different channel due to the false dependency of read-after-write, which causes a higher latency and is thus simply observable. Intel Optimization Manual highlights the read-afterwrite performance overhead in various sections [39] . As described in Section 11.8, this hazard occurs when a memory write is closely followed by a read, and it causes the read to be reissued with a potential 5 cycles penalty. 1 In Section B.1.4 on memory bounds, write operations are treated under the store bound category. In contrast to load bounds, Top-down Microarchitecture Analysis Method (TMAM) 2 reports store bounds as fraction of cycles with low execution port utilization and small performance impact. These descriptions in various sections highlight that read-after-write stall is considered more critical than write-after-read stall.
Memory Dependency Fuzz Testing
We performed a set of experiments to evaluate the memory dependency behavior between two logical processors. In these experiments, we have thread A and B running on the same physical core, but on different logical processors, as shown in Fig. 2 . Both threads perform memory operations; only thread B measures its timing and hence the timing impact of introduced false dependencies.
Read-after-read (RaR) In the first experiment, the two logical threads A and B read from the same shared cache and can potentially block each other. This experiment can reveal cache bank conflicts, as used by CacheBleed [77] . B uses Listing 1 to perform read measurements and A constantly reads from different memory offsets and tries to introduce conflicts. A reads from three different type of offsets: (1) Different cache line than B, (2) same cache line, but different offset than B, and (3) same cache line and same offset as B. As depicted, there is no obvious difference between the histograms for three cases in Fig. 3a verifying the lack of cache bank conflicts on 7th generation CPUs.
Write-after-read (WaR) The histogram results for the second experiment on false dependency of write-after-read is shown in Fig. 3b , in which the cache line granularity is obvious. Thread A constantly reads from different type of memory offsets, while thread B uses Listing 2 to perform write measurements. The standard deviation for conflicted cache line (blue) and conflicted offset (red) between thread A and B is distinguishable from the green bar where there is no cache line conflict. This shows a high capacity cache granular behavior, but the slight difference between conflicted line and offset verifies the previous results stating a weak offset dependency [77] . Listing 2 is used to probe 8 parallel writes. r9 points to a measurement buffer, and r11 is initialized with the probe count Read-after-write (RaW) Figure 3c shows an experiment on measuring false dependency of read-after-write, in which, thread A constantly writes to different memory offsets. Thread B uses Listing 1 to perform read measurements. Accesses to three different types of offsets are clearly distinguishable. The conflicted cache line accesses (blue) are distinguishable from non-conflicted accesses (green). More importantly, conflicted accesses to the same offset (red) are also distinguishable from conflicted cache line accesses, resulting in a side channel with intra cache-line granularity. There is an average of 2 cycle penalty if the same cache line has been accessed, and a 10 cycle penalty if the same offset has been accessed. Note that the word offsets in our platform have 4 byte granularity. From an adversarial standpoint, this means that an adversary learns about bits 2-11 of the victim memory access, in which 4 bits (bits 2-5) are related to intra cache-line resolution, and thus goes beyond any other microarchitectural side channels known to exist on 6th and 7th generation Intel processors ( Fig. 6 ).
Read-after-weak-Write (RawW) In this experiment on the read-after-write conflicts, we followed a less greedy strategy on the conflicting thread. Rather than constantly writing to the same offset, A executes write instructions to the same offset with some gaps filled with other memory accesses and instructions. As shown in Fig. 4 , the channel dramatically became less effective. This tells us that causing read access penalty will be more effective with constant writes to the same offset without additional instruction. In this regard, we will use Listing 3 in our attack to achieve the maximum conflicts.
Read-after-write latency
In the last experiment, we tested the delay of execution over a varying number of conflicting reads. We created a code stub that includes 64 memory read instructions and a random combination of instructions between memory reads to create a more realistic computation. The combination is chosen in a way to avoid unexpected halts and to maintain the parallelism of all read operations. We measure the execution time of this computation on B, while A is writing to a conflicting offset. First, we measured the computation with 64 memory reads to addresses without conflicts. Our randomly generated code stub takes an average of 210 cycles to execute. On each International Journal of Parallel Programming 
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step of the experiments, as shown in Fig. 5 , we change some of the memory offsets to have the same last 12 bits of address as of A's conflicting write offset. We observe a growth on read accesses' latency by increasing the number of conflicting reads. Fig. 5 shows the results for a number of experiments. In all of them, the overall execution time of B is strongly dependent on the number of conflicting reads. Hence, we can use the RaW dependency to introduce strong timing behavior using bits 2-11 of a chosen target memory address. 
MemJam Correlation Attack
MemJam uses read-after-write false dependencies to introduce timing behavior to otherwise constant-time implementations. The resulting latency is then exploited using a correlation attack. MemJam proceeds with the following steps:
1. Attacker launches a process constantly writing to an address using Listing 3 where the last 12 bits match the virtual memory offset of a critical data that is read in the victim's process. 2. While the attacker's conflicting process is running, attacker queries the victim for encryption and records a ciphertext and execution time pair of the victim. Higher time infers more accesses to the critical offset. 3. Attacker repeats the previous step collecting ciphertext and time pairs.
The attack methodology resembles the Evict+Time strategy originally proposed by Tromer et al. [67] , except that the attacker uses false dependencies rather than evictions to slow down the target and that the slowdown only applies to an 4-byte block of a cache line. Furthermore, all of the victim's accesses addresses with the same last 12 bits are slowed down while an eviction only slows the first memory access(es). 
L1 Cache Addressing Bits
MemJam Leaked Address Bits
Intra Cache Line Leakage
Based on the intra cache level leakage in Fig. 6 , we divide a 64 byte cache line into 4-byte blocks and hypothesize that the access counts to a block are correlated with the running time of victim, while the attacker jams memory reads to that block, i.e., the attacker expects to observe a higher time when there are more accesses by the victim to the targeted 4-byte block and lower time when there are lower number of accesses. Based on this hypothesis, we apply a classical correlation based side-channel approach [49] to attack implementations of three different block ciphers, namely Triple DES, AES and SM4. SM4 among AES, Triple DES, and RC4 are the only available symmetric ciphers as part of Intel's IPP crypto library [42] . 3 Each implementation has optimizations to hinder cache attacks. In fact, the Triple DES and the AES implementations feature a constant cache profile and can thus be considered resistant to most microarchitectural attacks including cache attacks and high-resolution attacks as described in [54] . MemJam can still extract the keys from both implementations due to the intra cache-line spatial resolution as depicted in Fig. 6 . We describe the targeted implementations next, as well as the correlation models we use to attack them.
Attack 1: IPP Constant-Time Triple DES
The Triple DES encryption algorithm [55] is an extension of the DES (Data Encryption Standard) algorithm. While Triple DES was recently declared as deprecated [56], mainly due to its insufficient block size [12] and the resulting attacks for larger amounts of encrypted data, it is still supported or even required in many applications: The latest EMVCo 4 specification for payment systems permits its usage without further restrictions [27] , and current TLS 1.2 standard contains Triple DES as a legacy cipher [23] .
Given three different 56-bit keys K 1 , K 2 , K 3 and a 64-bit plain text block M, Triple DES in Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt (EDE) mode calculates the cipher text C as
DES itself is a Feistel network with 16 rounds. First the plain text M is permuted using an initial permutation M := IP(M) and then divided into two 32-bit blocks M = L 0 .R 0 . In round i ∈ {0, . . . , 15} the algorithm then calculates
for a given round key K i . The ciphertext C is obtained by applying the inverse of the initial permutation to the last blocks:
The Feistel function f (Fig. 7 ) takes a 48-bit round key K i and the current right block R i , and computes its output by doing the following steps:
1. Expand R i to 48 bits by generating eight 6-bit blocks
for j ∈ {0, . . . , 7}. 7 and set the substitution box inputs as
Partition the round key to eight 6-bit blocks
3. Use eight S-boxes S 0 , . . . S 7 to convert the 6-bit inputs into 4-bit outputs:
for each j ∈ {0, . . . , 7}. 4. Permute the S-Box outputs using a round permutation P to acquire the Feistel function output output := P S out i,0 . . . S out i, 7 . The round keys are generated using a schedule consisting of left shifts and permutations [55] , we skip a deeper explanation here. Decryption works the same as encryption, except that the round keys are applied in reverse order.
Our target, the Triple DES implementation of Intel's Integrated Performance Primitives Crypto library, comes in various flavors where each is optimized for a specific instruction set, but they all have similar cache behavior: The central DES encryption/decryption function Cipher_DES first applies the initial permutation, that is implemented as a fixed number of bit operations without any memory accesses. The following 16 rounds are unrolled, each round has exactly 2 + 16 memory accesses, where the first two memory accesses load the respective round key. The eight S-box inputs are processed consecutively; for each input (1) the substitution is performed (by reading from the fixed S-box array), and then (2) the 4-bit S-Box output is converted into its 32-bit permuted form (using another lookup table). Finally, these permuted outputs are XORed with each other to acquire the output of the Feistel function. Each S-box has 2 6 = 64 1-byte entries and therefore fits exactly into one cache line; the same applies to the permutation lookup table, which has 2 4 = 16 4-byte entries.
This implies that each cache line is accessed exactly once per round, leading to constant time cache behavior that prevents any attacks with cache-line granularity. To obtain data-dependent timing behavior, we used MemJam to induce false dependencies on the first four bytes of the first S-box, slowing down the read accesses to this offset. Since this gives us 4 bytes of resolution, we can deduce 4 bits of the respective S-box input, which correspond to 4 bits of the round key. A single observation consists of the resulting cipher text C i and the amount of clock cycles T i the Triple DES operation takes to execute. Using n of such measurements (with random plain texts), we can work ourselves into the cipher, starting from the last round. We loose the two least significant bits (written as "·") due to the 4-byte resolution of MemJam. Since the IPP implementation reverses the bit order of each block and round key, the least significant bits are written first. Maximizing the correlation corr(v, T ) between the binary vector v and the clock cycle count vector T over all possible round key blocks K 15,0 then gives us the four key bits K 3 [2] , K 3 [21] , K 3 [36] and K 3 [49] , since the slow runs should be nearly uniformly distributed for wrong guesses.
Single-round attack on triple DES
Multi-round attack on triple DES To get the missing 52 key bits, we repeat the attack process in a similar fashion for round 14: The round key block K 14,0 that we are interested in gives us key bits K 3 [9] , K 3 [28] , K 3 [31] and K 3 [43] , but we also need the last four bits of block B 14,0 ; for these, we have to partially calculate
, which depends on K 15,1 , K 15,4 , K 15,5 and K 15,7 , summing up to 4 · 6 = 24 additional key bits, of which two are already included in the round key K 14,0 .
Repeating the same process for round 13 (where we need almost all key bits from round 15 to calculate the relevant S-boxes in round 14) yields another 21 bits of key K 3 . The remaining 5 key bits are derived from round 12. To obtain the remaining keys K 1 and K 2 , we repeat the attack using cipher texts decrypted with K 3 .
To reduce the computational effort one can also take additional measurements on the other S-boxes, yielding up to 32 key bits in round 15; however, this also multiplies the amount of measurements, and one still needs to analyze prior rounds to retrieve the missing 24 key bits, although with greatly reduced time complexity. So, overall, we see that there is a trade-off between the amount of measurements and the computation time spent on the analysis.
Triple DES key recovery results on synthetic data
To verify the correctness of our attack we first generated some synthetic data, where the timings were set as the amount of accesses to the first four bytes of the first S-box. In this noise free setting we needed less than 1000 observations to find 19 bits of the 14th round key, with a correlation of 0.201.
Triple DES key recovery results using MemJam
The time needed for a successful attack primarily depends on the amount of measurements and the number of simultaneously guessed bits. The attacks on round 15 (4 key bits) and 12 (5 key bits) are negligible, but round 14 (26 key bits) needs 2 26 n steps and round 13 (21 key bits) 2 21 n steps; this corresponds to tens of hours of computation time per DES key. While this is significantly less than guessing all 56 bits at once, reducing the amount of measurements is still desirable. Figure 8 shows the correlations for different measurement counts, when guessing 14 key bits in round 14. Experiments showed that 250,000-300,000 measurements suffice to recover all three keys.
Attack 2: IPP Constant-Time AES
AES is a cipher based on substitution permutation network (SPN) with 10 rounds supporting 128-bit blocks and 128/192/256-bit keys [22] . The SubBytes is a security- Round keys are mixed with states, which are critical S-Box inputs and the main source of leakage. Hence, even an adversary who can partially determine which entry of the S-Box has been accessed is able to learn some information about the key. Among the efforts to make AES implementations more secure against cache attacks, Safe2Encrypt_RIJ128 function from Intel IPP cryptographic library is noteworthy. This implementation is the only production-level AES software implementation that features true cache constant-time behavior and does not utilize hardware extensions such as AES-NI or SSSE3 instruction sets. This implementation is also part of the Linux SGX SDK [38] and can be used for production code if the SDK is compiled from the scratch, i.e., it does not use prebuilt binaries. We verified the match between the implementation in Intel IPP binary and SGX SDK source code through reverse engineering. This implementation follows a very simple direction: (1) it implements AES using 256 byte S-Box lookups without any optimization such as T-Tables, (2) instead of accessing a single byte of memory on each S-Box lookup, it fetches four values from the same vertical column of 4 different cache lines and saves them to a local cache aligned buffer, finally, (3) It performs the S-Box replacement by picking the correct S-Box entry from the local buffer. This implementation is depicted in Fig. 9 . This implementation protects AES against any kind of cache attacks, as the attacker sees a constant cache access pattern: The S-Box table only occupies 4 cache lines, and on each SubBytes operation, all of them will sequentially be accessed. This implementation can be executed in less than 2000 cycles on a recent laptop processor. This is fast enough for many cryptographic applications, and it provides full protection against cache attacks, even if the attacker can interrupt the execution pipeline.
Based on MemJam 4-byte granular leakage channel, and the design of AES, we can create a simple correlation model to attack this implementation. The accessed table index of the last round for a given ciphertext byte c and key byte k is given as index = S −1 (c ⊕ k). We define matrix A for the access profile where each row corresponds to a known ciphertext, and each column indicates the number of accesses when index < 4. While we assume that the attacker causes slow-downs to the first 4-byte block of S-Box, we define matrix L for leakage where each row corresponds to a known ciphertext and each column indicates the victim's encryption time. Then our correlation attack is defined as the correlation between A and L, in which the higher the number of accesses, the higher the running time. Our results will verify that correlation is high, even though the implementation has dummy accesses to the monitored block. These can be ignored as noise, slightly reducing our maximum achievable correlation. AES key recovery results on synthetic data We first verified the correctness of our correlation model on synthetic data using a noise free leakage (generated by PIN [41] ). For each of the 16 key bytes using a vector that matches exactly to the number of accesses to the targeted block of S-Box for different ciphertexts, all the correct key bytes will have the highest correlation after 32,000 observations with the best and worst correlations of 0.046 and 0.029 respectively.
AES Key recovery results using (MemJam) Relying on the verification of Synthetic
Data, we plugged in the real attack data vector, which consists of pairs of ciphertext and time measured through repeated encryption of unknown data blocks. Results on AES show that we can effectively exploit the timing information, and break the so-called constant-time implementation. The victim execution of AES encryption function takes about 1700 and 2000 cycles without and with an active thread on the logical processor pair, respectively. The target AES implementation performs 640 memory accesses to the S-Box, including dummy accesses. If the spy thread constantly writes to any address that collides with an S-Box block offset, the time will increase to a range between 2000 and 2300 cycles. The observed variation in this range has a correlation with the number of accesses to that block. Figure 10 shows the linear relationship between the correlation of synthetic data and real attack data for one key byte after 2 million observations. Most of the possible key candidates for a target key byte have a matching peak and hill between the two observations. The highest correlation points in both cases declare the correct key byte (0.038 red, 0.014 blue). The quantitative difference is due to the expected noise in the real measurements. Figure 11 shows the correlation of 4 different key bytes after 2 million observations with the correct key bytes having the highest correlations. Our repeated experiments with different keys and ciphertexts show that 15 correct key bytes have the highest correlation ranks, and there is only the key byte at index 15 that has a high rank but not necessarily the highest. Figure 12 shows the key ranks over the number of observations. Key byte ranks take values between 1 and 256, where 1 means that the correct key byte is the most likely one. As it is shown, after only 200,000 observations, the key space is reduced to a computationally insecure space and a key can be found with an efficient key enumeration method [30] . After 2 million observations, all key bytes Observations   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 14 15 16 Key Bytes (Ranks)   1   1  1  1  3  1  4  1  69  1  15  7  6  24  15   1  34  1  1  1  3  1  6  1  3  3  8  1  9  5  1   1  42  1  1  1  1  1  3  1  2  1  13  1  7  2  1   1  12  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  2  1  1  4  4  1   1  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  2  3  1  1  2  3 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 except one of them are recovered. For most of the key bytes, only tens of thousands of measurements is suffice to recover the correct key byte (Fig. 13) . The non-optimized implementation of this attack processes 2 million observations in 5 min.
Attack 3: IPP Cache Protected SM4
SM4 (formerly SMS4) is a block cipher standardized by the Chinese government and the standard encryption for Wireless LAN Wired Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) [24] . SM4 features an unbalanced Feistel structure and supports 128-bit blocks and keys. SM4 is known to be secure and no relevant cryptanalytic attacks exist for the cipher. Figure 14 shows a schematic of one round of SM4. T1-T4 are 4 × 32-bit state variables of SM4. Within each round, the last three state variables and a 32-bit round key are mixed, and each byte of the output will be replaced by a non-linear S-Box value. After the non-linear layer, the combined 32-bit output of All the SM4 operations except the S-Box lookup are performed in 32-bit word sizes. Hence, SM4 implementation is both simple and efficient on modern architectures. We chose the function cpSMS4_Cipher from Intel IPP Cryptography library. Our target is based on the straightforward cipher algorithm with addition of S-Box cache state normalization. We recovered this implementation through reverse engineering of Intel IPP binaries. The implementation preloads four values from different cache lines of S-Box before the first round, and it mixes them with some dummy variables, forcing the processor to fill the relevant cache lines with S-Box table. This cache prefetching mechanism protects SM4 against asynchronous cache attacks. On our experimental setup, the implementation runs in about 700 cycles, which informs us that this implementation maintain a high speed while secure against asynchronous attacks. Interrupted attacks that leak intermediate states would not be as simple, since the interruption need to happen faster than 700 cycles. We will further discuss the difficulty of correlating any cache-granular information, even if we assume the adversary can interrupt the encryption and perform some intermediate observations. 1 32 , s x 2 32 , s x 3 32 , s x 4
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Single-round attack on SM4
We define c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 as the four 32-bit words of a ciphertext and k r as the secret round key for round r . We recursively follow the cipher structure from the last round with our ciphertext words as inputs, and write the last 5 rounds' relations as Eq. 1. In each round, x i r is the S-Box index, and i is the byte offset of the 32-bit word x r . With a similar approach to the attack on AES, we define matrix A for the access profile, where each row corresponds to a known ciphertext, and each column indicates the number of accesses when x i r < 4. Then we define the matrix L for the observed timing leakage and the correlation between A and L similar to the AES attack. In contrast, S-Box indices in the AES attack are defined based on a non-linear inverse S-Box operation of key and ciphertext, which eventually maps to all possible key candidates. In SM4, the index x i r is defined before any non-linear operation. As a result, an attack capable of distinguishing accesses of 4 out of 256 S-Box entries reveals only 6 bits per key byte. In the mentioned relations, performing the attack using this model on x i 32 , recovers the 6 most significant bits of each key byte i for the last round key (Total of 24 out of the 32 bits).
Multi-round attack on SM4
The relationship for round 31 can be used not only to recover 6-bit key candidates of round 31, but also the remaining unknown 8 bits of entropy for round 32. This is due to the linear property of function L and the recursive nature of newly created state variables. After the attack on round 32, similar to the round key, we only have certainty about 24 bits of the new state variable d 1 , but this information will be propagated as the input to round 31. The next round of attack for key byte of round 31 needs more computation to process an 8 bit of unknown key and 8 bit of unknown state (total of 16 bit), but this is computationally feasible, and the 8-bit key from round 32 with highest correlation can be recovered by attacking the S-Box indices in round 31. We recursively applied this model to each round resulting a correlation attack with the following steps, which gives us enough entropy to recover the key:
1. x 32 → 24 bits of k 32 .
2. x 31 → 24 bits of k 31 + 8 bits of k 32 3. x 30 → 24 bits of k 30 + 8 bits of k 31 4. x 29 → 24 bits of k 29 + 8 bits of k 30 5. x 28 → 24 bits of k 28 + 8 bits of k 29 6. Recover the key from k 32 , k 31 , k 30 , k 29 SM4 key recovery results on synthetic data Our noise-free synthetic data shows that 3000 observations are enough to find all correct 6-bit and 8-bit round key candidates with the highest correlations. Even in an interrupted cache attack or without cache protection, targeting this implementation using a cache-granular information would be much harder and inefficient due to the lack of intra cache-line resolution. If we only distinguish the 64-byte cache lines out of a 256-byte S-Box, we only learn 4 × 2-bit (total of 8 bits) out of 32-bit round keys, and on each round, we need to solve 8 bits + 24 bits of uncertainty. Although solving 32-bit of uncertainty sounds possible for a noise-free data, it is computationally much harder in a practical noisy setting. Our intra cache line leakage can exploit SM4 efficiently in a known-ciphertext scenario, while the best efficient cache attack on SM4 requires chosen plaintexts [57] .
SM4 key recovery results using MemJam The results on SM4 show even more effective key recovery against this implementation compared to AES. Figure 15 shows the correlation rate over measurements for one key byte in the first round of attack which 13,000 measurements is suffice to distinguish the correct 6-bit round key (blue) for this key byte. Figure 16 shows the correlation for 6-bit round keys after 5 rounds of repeated attack, and the correlation for 12-bit key candidates can be seen in Fig. 17 . The attack expects assurance on the correct key candidates for each round of attack before proceeding to the next round due to the recursive structure of SM4. In our experiment using real measurement data, we have noticed that 40,000 observations are sufficient to have assurance of correct key candidates with the highest correlations. Our implementation of the attack can recover the correct 6-bit and 8-bit keys, and it takes about 5 min to recover the cipher key. In Fig. 17 , we plotted the accumulated per byte correlations for all 8-bit candidates within each round of attack. During the computation of 6-bit candidates, the 8-bit candidates relate to 4 different state bytes. This accumulation greatly increases the result and the correct 8-bit key candidates have a very high aggregated correlation compared to the 6-bit candidates. Fig. 17 The accumulated correlations for SM4 8-bit keys after 5 rounds using 40,000 observations. Each correct candidate has the highest correlation
MemJaming SGX Enclave
Intel SGX is a trusted execution environment (TEE) extension released as part of Skylake processor generation [38] . The main goal of SGX is to protect runtime data and computation from system and physical adversaries. Having said that, SGX must remain secure in the presence of malicious OS, thus modification of OS resources for facilitation of side-channel attacks is relevant and within the considered threat model. Previous works demonstrate high resolution attacks with 4 kB page [69, 74] and 64 B cache line granularity [14, 54] . Intel declared microarchitectural leakages out of scope for SGX, thus pushing the burden of writing leakage free constant-time code onto enclave developers. Indeed, Intel follows this design paradigm and ensures constant cache-line accesses for its AES implementation, making it resistant to all previously known microarchitectural attacks in SGX.
In this section, we verify that MemJam is also applicable to SGX enclaves, as there is no fundamental microarchitectural changes to resist against memory false dependencies. We repeat the key recovery results against Intel's constant-time AES implementation after moving it into an SGX enclave. The results verify the exploitability of intra cache level channels against SGX secure enclaves. In fact, the attack can be reproduced in a straightforward manner. The only difference is a slower key recovery due to the increased measurement noise resulting from the enclave context switch.
SGX Enclave Experimental Setup and Assumptions
Following the threat model of CacheZoom [50, 54] , we assume that the system adversary has control over various OS resources. Please note that SGX was exactly designed to thwart the threat of such adversaries. The adversary uses its OS-level privileges to decrease the setup noise: We isolate one of the physical cores from the rest of the running tasks, and dedicate its logical processors to MemJam write conflict thread and the victim enclave. We further disable all the non-maskable interrupts on the target physical core and configure the CPU power and frequency scaling to maintain a constant frequency. We assume that the adversary can measure the execution time of Fig. 18 Correlations for 6 key bytes using 5 million observations. All of the correct candidates have the highest correlations an enclave interface that performs encryption, and the enclave interface only returns the ciphertext to the insecure environment. Both plaintexts and the secret encryption key are generated at runtime using RDRAND instruction, and they never leave the secure runtime environment of SGX enclave. The RDTSC instruction cannot be used inside an enclave. The attacker uses it right before the call to the enclave interface and again right after the enclave exit. As a result, the entire execution of the enclave interface, including the AES encryption, is measured. As before, an active thread causing read-after-write conflicts to the first four bytes of the AES S-Box is executed on the neighboring virtual processor of the SGX thread.
AES Key Recovery Results on SGX
Execution of the same AES encryption function as Sect. 5.2 inside an SGX enclave interface takes an average of 14,600 cycles with an active thread causing read-afterwrite conflicts to the first four bytes of the AES S-Box. The additional overhead is caused by the enclave context switch, which significantly increases the noise of the timing channel due to the variable timing behavior. Having that, this experiment shows a more practical timing behavior where adversaries cannot time the exact encryption operation, and they have to measure the time for a batch of operations. This not only shows that SGX is vulnerable to the MemJam attack, but it also demonstrates that MemJam is applicable in a realistic scenario. Figure 18 shows the key correlation results using 50 million timed encryptions in SGX, collected in 10 different time frames. We filtered outliers, i.e. measurements with high noise by only considering samples that are in the range of 2000 cycles of the mean. Among the 50 million samples, 93% pass the filtering, and we only calculated the correlations for the remaining traces. Figure 19 shows that we can successfully recover 14 out of 16 key bytes, revealing sufficient information for key recovery after 20 million observations.
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Countermeasures to Memory Leakages
In this section, we focus on countermeasures that are relevant to memory-related side channels and their applicability to defend against MemJam attack. First, we discuss techniques to identify and protect weak software implementations. Then, we discuss proposed hardware defense mechanisms and attack detection methods.
Software Level Countermeasures
Constant-time implementation techniques are a known remedy to prevent memory leakage and have already seen some adoptions by researchers and practitioners. Indeed, the analyzed implementations of IPP all use some measures to prevent memory leakages, though only at cache-line granularity. Cipher_DES and Safe2Encrypt_RIJ128 go further by ensuring an entirely uniform access pattern at cache-line granularity. Other crypto libraries have also adopted similar techniques, e.g. OpenSSL uses the scatter-gather technique [16] for their implementation of RSA [77] . Such hardened constant-time implementations are usually designed by experts who have knowledge of the underlying architecture and side-channel domain. Attacks such as MemJam show that uniform cache access pattern, cache state normalization [67] and scatter-gather technique [16] fail to protect cryptographic implementations. Bitsliced software implementations are secure against memory-related side channels and can be applied to cryptographic schemes such as DES and AES [10] . However, this limits the choice of efficient cryptographic schemes that are dependent on precomputed tables. Table access masking is another technique that has been adopted by some of the cryptographic libraries to defend against intra-cache line leakage: The table lookup  operation visits every single element of a table and uses an index mask to discard the  irrelevant values. Researchers have also proposed tools to automate the generation of code lacking memory leakages: Raccoon [60] enforces constant-time control flow, but stops at cache-line granularity and makes use of ORAM, which can be very costly. Escort [61] and EncLang [65] also transform code to constant-time representation in compilation phase. EncLang stops at page-level granularity and requires adoption of a new programming language. Escort is not focused on efficient protection against memory side channels and only focuses on arithmetic operations. That is, while these tools address memory leakages, they would need further fine-tuning to also address highresolution attacks like MemJam with 4-byte spatial granularity. Limiting the resolution to cache-level granularity still leaves the door open for CacheBleed [77] and Mem-Jam attacks. An alternative to generating robust code is to just ensure that code does not feature memory leakage by using analysis tools to verify constant-time properties: MASCAT [46] is a static code analysis tool, and CacheD [70] is a dynamic symbolic execution analyzer to detect cache leakages in software implementations. On the same direction, Langley's ctgrind and ct-verif [7] propose compiler-level verification techniques. Although these identification techniques can be extended to support an intra-cache line leakage model, there is only one proposal that practically considers this sensitive leakage model [25] .
Hardware Level Countermeasures
Known Hardware solutions to defend against cache attacks generally ignore leakages through false dependency. Relaxed inclusion cache is a secure counterpart to the inclusive LLC which only aims to defend LLC contention [47] . Solutions such as CacheBar [80] , Catalyst [51] and vCat [73] which isolate the LLC between different security domains cannot be scaled to thwart the MemJam attack, which exploits leakage in the L1 cache. Sanctum [21] is a secure processor design that uses page coloring to isolate cache. Further, they flush the L1 and TLB cache during context switch from/to secure enclaves. However, the effect of hyper-threading and false dependency has not been covered in such a design. A temporary workaround to defend against this attack is to disable hyper-threading. Ozone [9] , as a zero timing leakage processor, aims to defend against such leakages by allocating a constant computational resource to one execution thread per core ignoring the hyper-threading model.
Attack Detection
Another approach is to detect attacks while they are happening and then react accordingly. Proposed methods to detect cache attacks at runtime utilize hardware performance counters [17, 78] and transactional synchronization extensions (TSX) [20, 64] to detect abnormal microarchitectural behavior. Defense mechanisms based on performance counters that monitor cache activities such as the number of cache misses are incapable of detecting MemJam, as the attack does not introduce any irregular cache activity. Although one might argue using other performance counters for detection, its practicality is debatable. A monitoring agent needs to occupy an active thread and actively evaluate the number of memory read stalls. In our experiments, performing 50 million observations takes less than a minute. If such a detector exists, it has to monitor with a higher frequency than the attack, otherwise, it will be outperformed before any detection of suspicious behavior is possible. The effect of read-after-write hazards to the TSX has not been explored. However, we believe using TSX as a detector with low false-positives would not be practical, since the read-after-write hazards are common phenomena and TSX could fail due to other issues [39] . In the SGX world, detection of unexpected interrupts, as proposed in the literature [20] , does not apply to MemJam.
Preventing MemJam
The Cipher_DES and Safe2Encrypt_RIJ128 implementations have been designed to achieve a constant cache access profile by ensuring that the same cache lines are accessed every time regardless of the processed data. The 4-byte spatial resolution of MemJam, however, thwarts this countermeasure by providing intra cache-line resolution. One approach to restore security and protect against MemJam is to apply constant memory accesses with a 4-byte granularity. That would require accessing every fourth byte of the table for each memory lookup for the purpose of maintaining a uniform memory footprint. At that point, it might be easier to just do a true constant time implementation and access all entries each time, resting assured that there is no other effect somewhere hidden in the microarchitecture resulting in a leak with byte granularity.
The best remedy are hardware based implementations, e.g., AES-NI or hardware assisted implementations, e.g., SIMD-based bit-sliced implementations of AES or SM4. If available, such performant, yet constant-time instruction set extensions should exclusively be used to protect the targeted implementation in an efficient manner. For ciphers where such hardware support is not available, a true constant-time implementation e.g. based on bit-slicing seems to be the best, albeit slow, alternative. Intel IPP has different variants optimized for various generations of Intel instruction sets [43] . Intel IPP features different implementations of AES as well as SM4 in these variants. A list of these variants and implementations are given in Table 1 . As shown, the software-only variant of each of the analyzed ciphers is vulnerable to MemJam.
Applicability of MemJam
MemJam exploits false dependencies of memory read-after-writes (4K Aliasing), which was turned into a cache-based timing attack with a 4-byte spatial resolution. This makes MemJam similar to CacheBleed, which also provides a 4 byte granularity [77] . Consequently, any countermeasures aimed at providing uniform accesses at cache-line granularity do not work, as discussed in Sect. 7. For MemJam to work, the The variants will be merged at linker stage, each variant is optimized for a different generation of the Intel instruction set [37] . Developers can statically link specific variants with single processor static linking mode [43] false dependencies need to have an impact on the read after a false conflicting write. Table 2 highlights the availability of the cache bank conflicts and the 4K Aliasing leakage source: While bank conflicts are limited to few CPU generations, excluding all supporting SGX, 4K Aliasing is present in all Intel CPUs released in the last 10 years. Thus, MemJam applies to virtually all Intel CPUs that feature hyperthreading. An adversary performing the MemJam attack also does not need to know about the offset of an S-Box in the binary, since she can simply scan the 10-bits address entropy by introducing conflicts to different offsets and measuring the timing of the victim. In such a scenario, we assume that the S-Box table is aligned with the cache line size, since an unaligned S-Box in memory is already vulnerable to cache attacks [44, 58] . During the processing of an uniformly random input, each S-Box operation in an implementation such as Safe2Encrypt_RIJ128 accesses the first word column of the table with a probability of 1/16. Among 160 S-Box operations, an average of 10 memory accesses to the first S-Box is likely. While an attacker is causing RaW conflicts on increasing offsets, she can locate the S-Box offset as soon as she sees a timing behavior. This is important when it comes to obfuscated binaries or scenarios, where the offset of the S-Box is unknown.
As shown in Table 1 , all block cipher implementations of IPP feature at least one vulnerable variant. In cases where there is an implementation based on the AES-NI instruction set (or SSSE3 respectively), the library falls back to the basic version at runtime if the instruction set extensions are not available. The usability of this depends on the compilation and runtime configuration. Developers are allowed to statically link to a more risky variant [37] , and they need to assure not to use the vulnerable versions during linking. These ciphers should be avoided in cases where the hardware does not provide support, e.g., Core and Nehalem do not support AES-NI; also AES-NI can be disabled in some BIOS. For Triple DES, IPP gives only one implementation option: the vulnerable one studied in this work. Thus, for applications that demand the use of Triple DES (and there are still many such applications, as discussed in Sect. 5.1), there is no secure alternative available in IPP. This highlights that current hardware support for cryptographic primitives is restricted and if any cipher without explicit hardware support is required, this limitation may endanger the provided security.
MemJam is another piece of evidence that modern microarchitectures are too complex and constant-time implementations cannot simply be trusted, as assumptions about the underlying system often turn out to be wrong.
Conclusion
This work proposes MemJam, a new side-channel attack based on false dependencies. For the first time, we discovered new aspects of this side channel and its capabilities, and show how to extract secrets from modern cryptographic implementations. Mem-Jam uses false read-after-write dependencies to slow down accesses of the victim to a particular 4-byte memory block within a cache line. The resulting latency of otherwise constant-time implementations was exploited with state-of-the art timing side-channel analysis techniques. We showed how to apply the attack to recent implementations of Triple DES, AES and SM4, as found in Intel IPP. According to the available resources, the source of the leakage for the MemJam attack is present in all Intel CPU families released in the last 10 years [5, 39] , including newest generation CPUs. Our results also show that MemJam is a viable intra cache level attack applicable to SGX enclaves. Prior to MemJam, it might have seemed reasonable to design SGX enclaves under the paradigm that constant cache line accesses result in leakage-free code. However, the increased 4-byte intra cache-line granularity of MemJam shows that only code with true constant-time properties, i.e. constant execution flow and constant memory accesses can be expected to have no remaining leakage on modern microarchitectures.
